

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 15 March 1990
TO: DI Registry		
ROOM NO. 7E47	BUILDING OHB	
REMARKS:		
FROM: Office of African and Latin American Analysis		
ROOM NO. 3F45	BUILDING OHB	EXTENSION

Directorate of Intelligence
Office of African and Latin American Analysis

15 March 1990

NOTE FOR: Associate Deputy Director for
Intelligence

Star,

Attached is a fresh version of the
Nuclear Proliferation memo. After our
discussion this morning I met with several
of our South Africans and we went step-
by-step through the analytical line. I
think you will find this version clarifies
the ambiguities

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Deputy Director
African and Latin American Analysis

Attachment

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JUL-00560X/90

15 March 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM:

Acting Director of African and Latin
American Analysis, DI

SUBJECT: South Africa and Nuclear Proliferation

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1. South Africa appears close to a decision to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) after years of negotiation and threatened expulsion from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Most observers now expect Pretoria to sign the treaty later this year or in 1991.

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2. Two key factors appear to be pushing South Africa toward NPT accession. President de Klerk is trying to fight South Africa's international isolation and roll back financial and economic sanctions. The issue of nonadherence to the NPT is a source of international condemnation, and each year, South Africa faces potential expulsion from the IAEA. We believe de Klerk wants to remove this source of international criticism.

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3. We believe de Klerk will face significant domestic criticism if he fails to win international concessions for signing the NPT, since the weapons program is a source of pride and security for many whites. De Klerk will certainly want to gain assurances from Western governments that South Africa will have access to nuclear technology and commerce if he accedes to the treaty. In addition, he may push for other countries in southern Africa to sign the treaty as a condition of South African accession.

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SUBJECT: South Africa and Nuclear Proliferation

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4. South African accession to the NPT would mark the first time a country with a covert weapons program has signed the treaty.

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we believe it would have three possible options:

- Terminating its nuclear weapons program. This would require that South Africa place highly-enriched uranium inventories under IAEA safeguards.
- Declaring itself a nuclear weapons state. Under this scenario, Pretoria would maintain nuclear weapons stockpiles while subjecting nuclear materials not used for weapons purposes to safeguards. This would require revision of the NPT, which currently identifies only the US, USSR, UK, France, and China as nuclear weapons states.
- Maintaining a covert nuclear weapons program. Pretoria would have to secret away its nuclear weapons and deny having a weapons program. It is not clear how the IAEA would respond to such a denial.

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5. De Klerk's move toward NPT accession coincides with a period of virtually unprecedented regional and domestic change. De Klerk has reversed the relative emphasis former President Botha placed on military and political means to address South Africa's problems at home and in the region, deemphasizing military operations and security measures in favor of diplomatic, economic, and political solutions.

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6. Under de Klerk, South Africa has significantly enhanced its regional standing, improving ties with neighboring states, negotiating the phased withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, and agreeing to Namibian independence. As a result of South Africa's improving security position, de Klerk has cut some 14 percent from South Africa's defense budget and significantly trimmed research and development programs affecting a number of weapons systems.

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7. At the same time, de Klerk has taken dramatic steps at home--ordering the release of Nelson Mandela and unbanning the African National Congress--to end the political stalemate that has gripped the country in recent years. We believe de Klerk is committed to negotiating a new constitution with credible black leaders that will be acceptable to the majority of all South Africans and international observers, while protecting white

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SUBJECT: South Africa and Nuclear Proliferation [REDACTED]

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interests. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] most
observers believe this process could ebb and flow for several
years. [REDACTED]

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8. Predictions about the likely outcome of constitutional negotiations at this stage--with both the government and the opposition keeping silent on key questions--remain highly speculative. Any predictions about the position of any future South African government on nuclear issues would be at best speculative. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] it is conceivable that de Klerk is inclined to sign the treaty before taking South Africa into uncharted waters. In any event, we would expect de Klerk to try to resolve the nuclear question before implementation of a new constitution that substantially affects white control over the security forces.

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SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks

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William H. Webster

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ER 90-0400/2

Executive Secretary

9 Mar 90

Date

3637 (10-81)

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

ROUTING SLIP

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SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks

ER 90-0400/2

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3637 (10-81)

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ER 90-0400/2

9 March 1990


MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: South Africa

One of the questions raised by my Nuclear Intelligence Panel yesterday was whether we were looking at the implications of a change in South African government resulting from opening it to full participation by the black majority. If this occurs, what policy changes on nuclear development and proliferation could we anticipate?


William H. Webster

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Attachment:


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PAGE 003

TOT: 072209Z MAR 90

DIRECTOR 092818

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TO: [REDACTED]

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SERIAL: [REDACTED]

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PASS: [REDACTED]

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T --WNINTEL--NOFORN-- [REDACTED]

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DIST: 07 MARCH 1990

EXCLUSIVE DISSEMINATION TO ADDRESSEES LISTED AT END OF REPORT

COUNTRY: SOUTH AFRICA

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SUBJ: MEETING OF STATE PRESIDENT DE KLERK WITH SADF
GENERALS, ADMIRALS, AND SENIOR ARMSCOR OFFICIALS

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DOI: [REDACTED]

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

TEXT: 1. [REDACTED]

*De Klerk
calls on
military
to support
his reforms*

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STATE PRESIDENT F.W. ((DE KLERK)) HAD HELD A MEETING IN LATE FEBRUARY WITH ALL SADF GENERALS, ADMIRALS, AND SENIOR ARMAMENTS CORPORATION OF SOUTH AFRICA (ARMSCOR) OFFICIALS. THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WAS TO DISCUSS MEASURES TAKEN BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT (SAG) IN THE REFORM PROCESS AND TO EMPHASIZE DE KLERK'S APPRECIATION FOR AND SUPPORT TO THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT DURING A TIME OF SHRINKING BUDGETS AND CHANGING MISSIONS. DE KLERK EMPHASIZED THAT HIS REFORM AGENDA IS IRREVERSIBLE AND THE COUNTRY HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE BLACK MAJORITY. [REDACTED] DE KLERK SAID IT WAS INCUMBENT ON HIM AND HIS SENIOR DEFENSE MANAGERS TO INSTILL HOPE IN THE SOUTH AFRICANS WHO SUPPORT HIS REFORM AGENDA. THE SAG'S MOST IMPORTANT TASK, ACCORDING TO DE KLERK, WAS TO CREATE A POSITIVE, OPTIMISTIC IMAGE DURING THE REFORM PROCESS SO THAT THE 80 PERCENT OF SOUTH AFRICANS WHO SUPPORT POLITICAL CHANGE WILL BE ENCOURAGED AND CALM DURING THE DIFFICULT DAYS AHEAD.

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2. DE KLERK ADDED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR ARMSCOR AND THE SADF TO MAINTAIN A LOW PROFILE DURING THE COMING MONTHS. MILITARY MANEUVERS SHOULD BE KEPT TO A MINIMUM AND NEW WEAPON DEVELOPMENTS SHOULD NOT BE PUBLICIZED. THE PRESIDENT SAID THE SADF IS A SUPERIOR FIGHTING FORCE, UNCHALLENGED IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND ITS FUTURE BUDGETARY REQUIREMENTS SHOULD REFLECT THIS REALITY. TURNING TO ARMSCOR, DE KLERK STATED THAT ARMSCOR REPRESENTED A CONCENTRATION OF PRODUCTION AND ELECTRONIC SKILLS. [REDACTED] DE KLERK

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[REDACTED]

PAGE 004

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TOT: 072209Z MAR 90

DIRECTOR 092818

SAID THAT UTILIZATION OF THESE TALENTS OUTSIDE THE CONFINES OF
MILITARY WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED.

3. [REDACTED] DE KLERK'S SPEECH WAS WELL RECEIVED
BY THE ATTENDEES. HE DEMONSTRATED FORCEFULNESS, VIGOR, CALM
REASSURANCE, AND A PRESENCE WHICH HAS LONG BEEN LACKING IN SOUTH
AFRICAN POLITICS. ALTHOUGH DE KLERK'S MESSAGE WAS MOSTLY SYMBOLIC,
HIS PLEA FOR SUPPORT WAS NOT LOST, [REDACTED]

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ACQ: [REDACTED]

DISSEM: [REDACTED]

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WARNING: REPORT CLASS ~~S E C R E T~~--WARNING NOTICE- INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT

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[REDACTED]

CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.>
ORIG/REL: [REDACTED]

ALL PORTIONS

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NNNNEND OF MESSAGE

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